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PREFACE 
 
This report illustrates a Role Playing Game (RPG), which is being developed within the Water 
Research Commission (WRC) project “A stakeholder driven process to develop a Catchment 
Management Plan for the Kat River Valley”, hereafter quoted as “the Kat River project”. 
 
The RPG is called KatAWARE, like the multi-agent model (Farolfi-Bonté, 2005 and 2006) that 
backs it. The RPG is being developed within an iterative and participatory process called 
Companion Modelling – ComMod (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2005) aiming at co-constructing the 
multi-agent model KatAWARE and at the same time facilitating discussions and common 
decision-making around water management within the Kat River Water Users Association 
(WUA).  
 
The report is organized in four main chapters: the first chapter illustrates the position of the RPG 
in the ComMod process and its relations with the KatAWARE model; the second chapter looks 
at the main features of the RPG; the third chapter presents some outcomes of the first RPG 
session played at Fort Beaufort in November 2005; the last chapter concludes and defines the 
way forward.  
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1. THE ROLE-PLAYING GAME AND ITS POSITION WITHIN THE COMMOD 
PROCESS 
 
1.1 The development question 
The RPG, as the KatAWARE model aims at answering the following development question: 
“How to improve local water management in the Kat Valley through a better stakeholders 
participation and a more democratic decision-making process?”. The RPG should allow local 
stakeholders (the WUA) better understanding the KatAWARE model and, meanwhile, 
discussing strategies for water allocation over a period corresponding to two water business 
plans (5+5 years).  
The introduction of the RPG within the ComMod process adopted in the Kat River Project was 
strongly suggested by the “Social Team” of the Rhodes University research Group (Burt et al., 
2005a). They indicated the RPG as a useful tool to add concreteness to the ComMod process of 
co-construction of the KatAWARE model with the WUA.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the RPG 
a) Improve researchers’ knowledge on the local stakeholders’ decision-making and 
negotiation processes and practices.  
b) Improve local stakeholders’ knowledge on the possible consequences of the adoption of 
alternative water allocation and management strategies in a context of multi-sector uses 
of the resource; improve knowledge on the water system complexity at the catchment 
level; reduce asymmetry of information, increasing equity and transparency and 
enhancing efficiency in the decision-making process. 
c) Empower local stakeholders in their capacity of decision-making and negotiating.  
 
1.3 How knowledge and information was introduced into the RPG 
The RPG was constructed after the Prototype (Farolfi and Bonté, 2005) and V1 (Farolfi and 
Bonté, 2006) of the KatAWARE model were developed. As a consequence, all information and 
data available for the construction of the KAtAWARE model were used and mobilised for the 
RPG.  
 
1.4 Relation between the RPG and the reality at the conceptualising stage 
The RPG formalises a simplified explicit reality. The schematised Kat River Catchment is 
represented in the RPG space (Figure 1, cf. also next section) and the players are real 
stakeholders that face environmental and socio-economic parameters “real” as much as possible, 
and modified only to make the game “playable”. The catchment representation in the RPG is a 
direct derivation of the catchment representation in the KatAWARE model V1 and was 
legitimated and approved by all players during the first session played at Fort Beaufort in 
November 2005.  
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Figure 1 - The “playground” in KatAWARE RPG: schematised catchment and its 
translation into a RPG session 
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2.  GAME DESCRIPTION 
This chapter illustrates the rules and functioning of the RPG through the game explanation 
provided to each player at the beginning of the RPG session. Some elements of RPG analysis 
and facilitation are provided at the end of this section. 
2.1 The context 
The water catchment where you leave and work (Figure 1) is divided into three sub-catchments: 
Upper, Middle and Lower. Two smallholding irrigation schemes (20 ha each) are located in the 
Upper Sub-catchment (US), two citrus farms (30 ha each) are located in the Middle Sub-
catchment (MS) and one citrus farm (40 ha) is in the Lower Sub-catchment (LS).  
Domestic water users live in three villages: one in the US (3 000 hab), one in the MS (5 000 hab) 
and one (15 000 hab) in the LS. 
An average amount of water of 2 million mc/year falls in the US, whilst annual waterfall 
corresponds to 1 million mc/year in the MS and LS.  
A dam with a storage capacity of 4 million mc is located in the US. 
A Water Users Association (WUA) exists in the catchment and is responsible for water 
management and allocation according to the principles of Social Equity, Environmental 
Sustainability and Economic Efficiency as indicated in the Water Legislation of South Africa. 
All players are members of the WUA. 
 
2.2 Goals  
The primary goal is for your group as a whole to manage in a sustainable way your available 
water resource, taking into consideration the above-mentioned principles. The secondary goal is 
for each player (or team of players) to maximise your individual economic gain and if you are a 
village manager to maximise villagers’ satisfaction, within the context of the group goal. 
2.3 The players 
Five farming players (two smallholding farmers representing an irrigation scheme each and three 
large scale citrus farmers) are part of the game.  
Three players impersonate the local public managers responsible for water provision to domestic 
users in the three villages.  
All players are members of the local WUA and elect a president, which will call annual WUA’s 
meetings. The WUA is managing the dam upstream the catchment and decides water releases as 
well as water allocations and prices for each sector. 
A banker is responsible for money distribution and takes records of each players possible debt.  
The game operator is neutral and will provide the players with the results of their chosen water 
allocation scenarios. 
2.4 Resources, initial state and production choices 
If you are a Farmer:  
You have a surface irrigated on which you produce Cabbages if you are a smallholder or Citrus 
if you are a large-scale farmer.  
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At the beginning of the game you will receive a number of hectares corresponding to your farm 
(or irrigation scheme) and for each ha a symbol corresponding to your production: Cabbage or 
Citrus. 
You will also receive an amount of money corresponding to your previous year’s profit and a n. 
of workers indicating how many permanent and seasonal employees you had the previous 
season.  
Every year you may decide to increase or reduce your irrigated surface. You can decide to 
change your production (cabbage to citrus or vice versa). If you decide to plant new citrus, you 
can choose an innovative irrigation technology (drip), which would cost more but will save 
water.  
Cabbage producers can decide to have 1 cycle, 2 cycles or 3 cycles of cabbage production per 
year on their fields. 
Budgets and water consumption data for Citrus and Cabbage are provided to farmers at the 
beginning of the game.  
 
If you are a local public manager in a village:  
You receive, and pay for, bulk water from the WUA that manages the entire water in the 
catchment. You also provide water services (including water distribution) to the households of 
your village. 
You start with a given ratio of water sources for the households of your village. These water 
sources are: river water; collective tap; indwelling tap. Each water source implies a different cost 
for you (investment + operating cost) in addition to the cost of the bulk water you “buy” from the 
WUA.  
You can charge your habitants with a per capita tariff for the water services you provide, and this 
corresponds to your annual income.  
The households of your village get a certain level of satisfaction from their income that they can 
spend buying consumption goods. They also get different levels of satisfaction from the three 
sources of water they dispose of.  
You have a double objective: 1) maximise your households’ satisfaction providing them the best 
possible water sources; 2) make your budget sustainable, which means balance your cost for 
water provision with the income you can get from the water charges paid by households.  
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Elements of budgets and satisfaction indexes for households are provided to local public 
managers at the beginning of the game.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Two farms and a village in the RPG 
2.5 Water management at the catchment level 
At the beginning of every year, each player defines individually his strategy for the season to 
come. Then the WUA President calls a meeting and all players negotiate about water demands in 
function of water availability in the catchment. The WUA disposes of a model that provides 
simulations over a year and for each sub-catchment on monthly water availability (including the 
water storage in the dam), water demands, and possible water deficits to be avoided through 
water releases from the dam. Water deficits result in a dry river, which corresponds to a non-
respect of the ecological Reserve.  
Running the model, the WUA can decide to accept or not the players’ proposals for the year 
(which correspond to a water allocation strategy) and the consequent dam management (water 
releases for the three sub-catchments). WUA finally decides water prices to be paid by the 
different players.  
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2.6 Environmental and market (exogenous) factors  
Players strategies can be influenced by a number of factors varying annually. These factors 
depend on external dynamics. Players are informed about exogenous factors at the beginning of 
each year. These factors include environmental data: Annual rainfall foreseen in US, MS and LS; 
market data: Citrus and Cabbage prices; and demographic data: population in the three villages 
of the catchment.  
 
Figure 3 – Posters indicating exogenous factors and dam management 
 
2.7 Decision sheets and players performance criteria 
You will draw up a decision sheet, where every year you input your choices as indicated in the 
point 2.4). An example of decision sheets for farmers and for village water managers is provided 
hereafter (2.9). Before you finalise your decision sheet, you will have opportunities to discuss 
your requirements with the WUA and to negotiate with other individual players. Once your 
annual strategy is cleared by the WUA, your decision sheet is passed to the game operator, who 
puts this information into the KatAWARE RPG model. 
The economic and social results of your choices and WUA strategies, together with the state of 
the resource, are made available yearly and at the end of each year your financial situation as 
well as your job-creation (if you are a farmer) or your households’ satisfaction (if you are a water 
provider in a village) are updated.  
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2.8 Game steps 
Every year, all players accomplish the following steps: 
1. Receive the results from the computer updating their situation in terms of: cultivated 
surfaces; profit; employees; households’ satisfaction. 
2. Receive the updated information about water availability, market prices, and 
demographic dynamics in the catchment (exogenous factors).  
3. Make their choice regarding surfaces, productions, irrigation technology, households’ 
water sources and water price of domestic users for next year (decision sheets). 
4. WUA discusses the strategies and takes a decision on: a) water price for each group of 
stakeholders; b) water releases from the dam; c) acceptation or not of the players’ 
proposals. For this phase, the WUA uses a model that simulates a one-year water demand 
and supply in the catchment according to the exogenous factors and the players’ 
proposals.  
5. Once WUA has cleared all proposals, players fill definitively their decision sheet and 
provide it to the game operator. 
 
2.9 How the Decision Sheets look 
 
Farmer (Cabbage) 
FARM 1
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ANNUAL CROPS PLANTED EVERY YEAR 
Cabbage 1 cycle (HA)
Cabbage 2 cycles (HA) 20
Cabbage 3 cycles (HA)
TOTAL CABBAGE (HA) 20
CITRUS TREES STAY IN THE GROUND YEAR AFTER YEAR
New citrus old technology (HA)
New citrus new technology (HA)
Citrus pulled out (HA)
TOTAL CITRUS (HA) 0
 
Farmer (Citrus) 
FARM 3
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ANNUAL CROPS PLANTED EVERY YEAR 
Cabbage 1 cycle (HA)
Cabbage 2 cycles (HA) 0
Cabbage 3 cycles (HA)
TOTAL CABBAGE (HA) 0
CITRUS TREES STAY IN THE GROUND YEAR AFTER YEAR
New citrus old technology (HA) 30
New citrus new technology (HA)
Citrus pulled out (HA)
TOTAL CITRUS (HA) 30
 
 
 
 
 
 8
Village 
VILLAGE 1
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Proportion River (0 to 1) 0.8
Proportion Collective (0 to 1) 0.2
Proportion Indwelling (0 to 1) 0
Price water (R/mc) 1
 
2.10 Facilitation and analysis of a RPG session  
The game session in November 2005 was jointly facilitated by the modelling team (MT) (JP 
Muller and S Farolfi) and 8 researchers/students from the social team (ST) of the Kat River 
Project at Rhodes University.  
 The following functions were delegated to the two facilitating groups.  
• Participants (players) convocation (ST)  
• Rules explanation-briefing (MT+ST) 
• Roles distribution (ST+Players)  
• Players’ companion during the RPG session (ST) 
• Check for time and rules respect (MT+ST) 
• Assure the “funny side” of the session (ST) 
• Observe behaviour (MT+ST) 
• Actions and practices record (MT)  
• Facilitating discussions (MT+ST)  
 
The RPG session analysis was organised as follows:  
The analysed elements are mainly players’ individual and collectives actions (choices). The 
computer can systematically record the consequences of these choices, such as economic 
gains/losses, job creation/loss, used/available water, ecological state of the river etc. Other 
elements regarding players’ behaviour, routine/tension moments during the session, can also be 
analysed through a videotape that recorded the whole session.  
A first debriefing was done just after the session in November. A second one, more complete (cf. 
following section) will be implemented before the next session in March. 
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3.  OUTCOMES OF THE FIRST RPG SESSION (FORT BEAUFORT, NOVEMBER 
2005) 
 
This section illustrates some outcomes of a RPG session held in the Kat River in November 
2005. The set-up of the game is indicated in figure 1 and included two irrigation schemes and a 
village in the US, two large scale farmers and a village in the MS, and a large scale farmer and a 
village in the LS.  
The initial values characterizing each player are indicated in the left column of table 2, which 
also includes final values (end of year 6 of the session) providing an indication of the strategies 
and trends followed by players during the RPG session.  
Table 1 shows the initial and final values of the exogenous factors controlled by the game 
operators. The game facilitators introduced a general trend of increasing water scarcity. This 
stress was produced by a combination of lower rainfall and increasing population in the 
catchment. Some marginal changes (mainly reductions) affected crop prices. A relatively low 
level of uncertainty was introduced in the session, corresponding to a small difference between 
expected (forecasted) and actual exogenous factors to which stakeholders were confronted.  
Initial Final Difference 
%
Rainfall Upper (m3) 2,000,000 1,400,000 -30
Rainfall Middle (m3) 1,000,000 600,000 -40
Rainfall Lower (m3) 1,000,000 600,000 -40
Population Upper (hab.) 3,000 3,500 17
Population Middle  (hab.) 5,000 5,500 10
Population Lower  (hab.) 15,000 16,000 7
Market Price Citrus (R/ton) 2,000 2,000 0
Market Price Cabbage (R/bag) 6 5 -17
 
Table 1 – Exogenous factors in the RPG session: initial and final values 
 
During the session, players in the three sub-catchments opted first for strategies demanding an 
increasing amount of water (Fig. 4), and then they were obliged to contract their consumption 
due to an excessive use of water from the dam, its consequent lowering level of water stored 
(Fig. 5) and the decision by the WUA to stop the water flushes during the final year of the RPG 
session.  
Clear differences in behaviour and strategies among players were observed for different sectors 
and in the three sub-catchments (tables 2 and 3).  
In the US the two irrigation schemes opted first for an intensification of their cabbage 
productions (from 2 to 3 cycles per year). Only at the end of the RPG session the second 
irrigation scheme decided to reduce the cultivated surface by 50%.  
In the MS, the two citrus farmers adopted two very different strategies, the one oriented first 
towards diversification (cabbage in addition to citrus) and then abandoning citrus, whilst the 
other one kept constant the citrus surface but also planted an equivalent surface at cabbage.  
In the LS, the large citrus farm adopted a quite “conservative” strategy consisting in reducing 
only by 25% the planted surface at citrus and not moving to cabbage.  
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All new citrus plants in the three farms were equipped with innovative irrigation technologies, 
consisting in drip systems, more costly in terms of investment, but water saving.  
Table 2 shows the dynamics in the village managers’ decisions regarding water services and 
tariffs for their households. As a general trend, better water provision was introduced in all 
villages, and this was accompanied by and increase of water tariffs to be paid by local 
households. In some cases the increase in domestic water tariffs was perceived too high by local 
residents (village 3), affecting negatively their satisfaction index. On the other hand, the water 
tariff growth in village 3 triggered a huge improvement in the village manager’s profit. 
It was clear that the WUA gave priority to the domestic uses of water, not hampering any 
initiative of improvement of water provision by the local managers. The respect of an ecological 
reserve set at 500,000 cubic meters/year in years of drought and 750,000 in normal years was 
another WUA priority. Agricultural uses were more controlled and the release of new water 
licenses to farmers was less automatic, particularly when the dam reserve became scarce (last 
three year of the RPG session). 
The water allocation policy by the WUA allowed positive results in terms of economic outputs 
for four farms out of five (cumulated profit). Cabbage was more profitable than citrus following 
a better trend in market price (apart from the final year). Particularly, farm 4 paid the cost of 
heavy investment in new hectares planted at citrus combined with lower market prices in years 3 
and 4; in addition, the session was too short to allow the farmer recovering the investment 
through new citrus plants production.   
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Initial Final Difference
%
Irrigation scheme 1 (US)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0
Ha cabbage 20 20 0.0
Cycles cabbage 2 3 50.0
Tot Ha 20 20 0.0
Employment (n) 51 77 51.0
Cumulated Profit (ZAR) 64,208 250,000 289.4
Irrigation scheme 2 (US)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0
Ha cabbage 20 10 -50.0
Cycles cabbage 2 2 0.0
Tot Ha 20 10 -50.0
Employment (n) 51 25 -51.0
Cumulated Profit (ZAR) 64,208 250,000 289.4
Citrus farm 1 (MS)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 -100.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 5 _
Ha cabbage 0 30 _
Cycles cabbage 0 1 _
Tot Ha 30 35 16.7
Employment (n) 46 46 0.0
Cumulated Profit (ZAR) 829,300 3,290,000 296.7
Citrus farm 2 (MS)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 -100.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 30 _
Ha cabbage 0 30 _
Cycles cabbage 0 1 _
Tot Ha 30 60 100.0
Employment (n) 46 84 82.6
Cumulated Profit (ZAR) 829,300 740,000 -10.8
Citrus farm 3 (LS)
Ha citrus old technology 40 0 -100.0
Ha citrus new technology 0 30 _
Ha cabbage 0 0 0.0
Cycles cabbage 0 0 0.0
Tot Ha 40 30 -25.0
Employment (n) 62 44 -29.0
Cumulated Profit (ZAR) 1,105,700 2,710,000 145.1  
Table 2 – Strategies and outcomes for the five farms during the RPG session: initial and 
final values  
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Initial Final Difference
%
Village 1 (US)
Population (hab.) 3,000 3,500 16.7
% river 0.8 0.0 -80.0
% collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0
% indwelling tap 0.0 0.8 80.0
Water tariff (ZAR/m3) 1 2 100.0
Satisfaction index 40.6 41.7 2.8
Manager's cum. Profit (ZAR) 20,500 420,000 1,948.8
Village 2 (MS)
Population (hab.) 5,000 5,500 10.0
% river 0.8 0 -80.0
% collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0
% indwelling tap 0 0.8 80.0
Water tariff (ZAR/m3) 1 1.7 70.0
Satisfaction index 40.6 42.9 5.7
Manager's cum. Profit (ZAR) 34,180 300,000 777.7
Village 3 (LS)
Population (hab.) 15,000 16,000 6.7
% river 0.1 0 -10.0
% collective tap 0.4 0 -40.0
% indwelling tap 0.5 1 50.0
Water tariff (ZAR/m3) 1.5 2 33.3
Satisfaction index 42.7 41.9 -1.8
Manager's cum. Profit (ZAR) 128,130 2,110,000 1,546.8  
Table 3 – Strategies and outcomes for the three villages during the RPG session: initial and 
final values 
 
Job creation was positive for some farms and negative for other. Employment is a cost for the 
farmer, who does not have it as a “social goal”. Individual strategies aim at improving economic 
outputs, whereas social objectives, such as job creation in the catchment should be pursued by 
the local authorities.  
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Figure 4 – Water consumption in the three sub-catchments 
 
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of water consumption in the three sub catchments. At year 1 LS is 
the most water consuming (large village and large citrus farm) followed by MS and US. Le latter 
increases consistently water consumption during years 2 to 4 due mainly to the intensification of 
cabbage production. The slight increase in water consumption in the remaining sub catchments is 
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due to domestic better provision and population increase. At year 5, water consumption in US 
contracted due to a change of strategy in one of the two irrigation schemes. At year 6 the WUA 
decided to stop releasing water from the dam in order to allow refilling.   
 
Figures 5-7 show the dynamics of water consumption (red line) and water remaining in the river 
after consumption in the three sub-catchments during the session.  
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Figure 5 – Monthly water consumption (red line)  and water flowing in the river after 
consumption: Upper Sub catchment 
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Figure 6 – Monthly water consumption (red line)  and water flowing in the river after 
consumption: Middle Sub catchment 
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Figure 7 – Monthly water consumption (red line)  and water flowing in the river after 
consumption: Lower Sub catchment 
 
The trend in water consumption is increasing in the three sub-catchments over the first 4 years of 
the session, determining a growing stress in the MS and particularly in the LS (no water flowing 
in the river during some months). Cyclical consumptions due to annual crops are visible in the 
US, whilst more regular demands due to domestic uses and citrus production are identifiable in 
the MS and LS.   
The increasing water demand in the three sub-catchments is partially compensated by water 
releases from the Dam decided by the WUA. Figure 8 indicates the water level in the Dam. 
WUA opted for a use of the water in the Dam to satisfy users’ water demand and to provide a 
water flow in the river able to preserve ecological equilibriums (the ecological Reserve).  
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Fig. 8 – Dam level 
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 At the end of year 5, when the Dam level reaches almost 1 million cubic meters, the WUA 
decided to stop suddenly and completely water flashes. This decision determined an 
improvement of the dam water quantity, but had an immediate and dramatic consequence on the 
socio-economic and environmental indicators in the catchment.  
 
Figures 9 and 10 show the impact of water uses and management on profit and employment in 
the three sub-catchments.  
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Figure 9 – Profit generation in the three sub-catchments 
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Figure 10 – Job creation in the three sub-catchments 
 
Job creation is linked to the surfaces cropped and to the intensity of production (cycles of 
cabbages on the same surface); it therefore follows the dynamics of water consumption. Profit is 
more sensitive to water availability and during the first years of game is (negatively) influenced 
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by high investments in the citrus farms1. Figure 9 shows clearly the heavy impact on profit 
generation for the three sub catchments of the WUA decision at year 6. Again, MS and LS where 
citrus farms are located suffer particularly for the water shortage. 
 
It is worthwhile noticing, finally, that the decision to stop completely water flushes from the dam 
had a negative impact also on the ecological reserve.  
                                                 
1 In this game, profit=total income-total costs. If a farmer invests in citrus plantations, therefore, his annual income 
during the first years of new orchards is constant (no production) whilst the costs increase. It was noticed by citrus 
farmers during the game debriefing that this is not really how they see things because an investment is calculated as 
a positive asset in their budget, whereas here is a negative (cost) one. They suggested calling “cash-flow” what we 
call “profit” in the game outcomes.  
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4. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
The RPG KatAWARE was played for a first session with the Kat River WUA in November 
2005. A second session is scheduled for March 2006. A following work back to the KatAWARE 
model is then foreseen. Apart from the mentioned objectives of improving WUA’s capacity of 
negotiation and common-decision-making (cf. Burt et al, 2005b), this will allow modellers 
introducing into the next version of the model (V2) that information about stakeholders’ 
behaviour and practices derived from observation during the two game sessions. It is possible, 
but not sure, that a final session of the RPG will be played with the WUA after the presentation 
and discussion of the model’s V2.   
A use of the RPG in a modified and simplified version as a pedagogic tool (e.g. for university 
students) is also envisaged. 
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